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Not sufficiently harmonised national pension systems within the European Union distort the 
allocation of labour and endanger redistributive activities. This paper identifies the most 
decentralised level of harmonisation which guarantees efficient allocation and enables 
redistribution. For this, we build on theoretical results to evaluate the realised distribution of 
the legal power between the European Union and the Member States and the resulting level of 
harmonisation. We find that harmonisation is sub-optimally low. Binding rules guaranteed by 
the European Union are needed which means that the Member States have to concede more 
fundamental responsibilities to the European Union.  
JEL Classification: F22, H55, K33, N34. 
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1. Introduction 
Article 8a of the Treaty gives every citizen of the 
Union the right to reside freely within the territory 
of the Member States. […] The challenge now is 
therefore to create a real European mobility area 
[…]  European Commission (1994, p.26) 
In the European Union, mobility is low. Each year, only 0.2% of the population migrate to 
he realisation of one of the most fundamental goals of the European Union – free mobility as 
 is especially important to avoid competition among countries in areas where the state 
                                                
another European country (OECD, 2001) and only 1.2% move to another European region 
(Gros and Hefeker, 1999). In the United States, mobility between States is about three times 
as high as mobility within Germany or within England and Wales (Eichengreen, 1991). With 
further European integration and thus lower barriers to migration, this is expected to change. 
But even if the total volume of migration would not increase by much, a higher degree of 
mobility of those individuals who contribute to the unfunded pension systems would be 
enough for the Member States to engage in competition. Marginal mobility is all that is 
needed for this to start (Sinn, 1998). Inner-European mobility is thus associated with fears that 
competition over mobile individuals will lead to a “race to the bottom” of old-age security.  
 
T
part of the common internal market – has consequences for efficiency and redistribution. If 
mobility is not distorted due to legal or real impediments, a higher degree of mobility allows 
for a more efficient allocation of labour across Member States which increases national 
incomes and thus the resources available for redistribution. However, this is only the case if 
redistributive activities are sufficiently harmonised. Otherwise efficiency is not reached while, 
in addition, mobility reduces the scope for redistribution by putting pressure on the national 
fiscal systems and on the national pension systems (Sinn, 1998). These arguments make it 
clear that economically reasonable levels of harmonisation of the national pension systems are 




should step in on the national level according to the “selection principle” because a market 
failure has been identified (Sinn, 1997, 2003). Introducing competition on the European level 
cannot lead to an efficient outcome if old-age security fulfils the criteria for an intervention of 
the state on the national level. A (rather) centralised solution is then the best. In fact, old-age 
 
1 It is sometimes argued that migration from non-European countries might help to guarantee financial 
sustainability of the European pension systems in the presence of ageing. Calculations by the United Nations 
(2000), however, show that the migration volumes needed exceed by far the present volumes. The OECD (2001) 
confirms this by observing that the importance of migration with respect to reducing demographic imbalances 
should not be overstated. Net immigration might prevent a decrease in population for a limited time; but it 
certainly cannot on its own provide an answer to population ageing. 
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security organised as unfunded pension systems involves a social contract between 
generations – alive and not yet born. This contract, which has been concluded on behalf of the 
individual by the parents or grandparents, would not have any binding effect in the private 
insurance market. An intervention of the state is thus necessary on the national and on the 
European level to guarantee the fulfilment of the social contract.
2  
 
This intervention can take place in different ways. In this paper, we identify the optimal most 
o far, harmonisation is in the European Union sub-optimally low. Free labour mobility is 
 what follows we assume that the European Union is a closed economy and abstract from 
originating from a Beveridgean or Bismarckian tradition, and section 8 concludes.   
                                                
decentralised solution and compare it to the institutional set-up. For this we analyse the 
institutional distribution of competences, i.e. of the legal power to decide about pension 
issues, between the European Union and the Member States and the realised level of harmoni-
sation. Harmonisation is understood as a rather general concept. On the one hand, it comprises 
measures which link national pension systems closer to one another. These measures are thus 
particularly suitable for systems which are similar in important respects. On the other hand, it 
includes measures which regulate the reassignment of migrants without modifying national 
pension systems. These measures are also well applicable to systems which show essential 
differences. Both types of measures will be discussed in the following.  
 
S
ensured by the mutual recognition of pension claims by the Member States. This, however, 
does not remove the allocative distortions and does not prevent the erosion of redistributive 
activities. As will be shown, the main competences for pension systems could stay with the 
Member States. But the European Union must guarantee the binding nature of the respective 
harmonisation rules. Although the European Union has gained responsibilities in the area of 
social policy in the last decades, the Member States are reluctant to concede further, more 
fundamental rights. A more courageous approach leading to a more pronounced involvement 
of the European level is, however, needed.    
 
In
interactions with non-EU countries via, e.g., external migration flows. We focus exclusively 
on the first pillar of pension systems, i.e. on mandatory, publicly organised unfunded systems. 
In section 2, we analyse distortions of the migration decision in the absence of harmonisation 
of the national pension systems. Potential solutions to the problem are discussed in section 3. 
For pension systems which are similar with respect to important aspect, e.g. size and 
generosity, section 4 analyses the optimal level of harmonisation while section 5 looks at the 
institutionally realised level of harmonisation. In section 6, we evaluate the institutional 
findings for the allocation of labour and redistributive activities. Section 7 discusses an 
enlargement of the policy space for systems displaying fundamental differences e.g. 
 
2 We abstract here from discussing the optimality of the initial conclusion of this contract. 
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2. Distorted migration in the absence of harmonisation 
A simple two-country model suffices to illustrate the basic consequences of not sufficiently 
harmonised pension systems for efficiency and redistribution (Wildasin, 1999). Let the total 
population of countries f and g be  g f N N N + =  where we assume that all individuals in both 
*
countries work. In the absence of any public intervention, with equal goods prices and without 
migration costs, individuals migrate until gross wages are equal in both countries. With 
competitive labour markets, this im ty of the marginal productivities of labour in 
both countries. The resulting allocation of labour with  f N  individuals in country f  and 
plies equali
*
f N N −  individuals in country g is efficient.  
 
Now, we add activities of the public sector to our analysis here  i  w Γ  defines the difference 
i. If benefits are different from paym
between the benefits an individua  the payments an individual has to make in 
ts, the system creates a wedge between net 
ages and gross wages. In the following we abstract from other taxes and transfers and focus 
ch has to be 




on possible distortions due to the unfunded pension system. This enables us to see how 
differently attractive unfunded pension systems influence the migration decision which 
implies a comparison of the present value of lifetime net income. We therefore reinterpret the 
static model in present-value terms thus allowing for a multi-period perspective.  
 
For this analysis we make use of the concept of implicit taxes. When an unfunded pension 
system is introduced, the first, introductory generation receives pension benefits without 
having (much) contributed. This introductory gift generates an implicit debt whi
s
difference between the present value of pension benefits and contributions and depends on the 
difference of the internal rate of return of the pension system and the market rate of return. If 
the internal rate of return falls short of the market rate of return, part of the contributions to 
the unfunded pension system is lost or would not be necessary if contributions were invested 
in the capital market. This part is called the implicit tax part  i Γ .
3 
 
The internal rate of return itself depends on the productivity growth rate and the population 
growth rate (Aaron, 1966). As has been already mentioned, the ratio of young to old, i.e. of 
contributors to retirees, is essential for the sustainability and profitability of unfunded pension 
ystems. The development of fertility, life-expectancy, and migration is thus an important 
                                                
s
determinant of the internal rate of return and of the size of the implicit taxes. 
 
 
3 See Sinn (2000) for explicit derivations of the implicit tax. 
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When individuals decide about whether and where to migrate, they take lifetime net wage 
income into account. The lifetime net wage income an individual can earn in country i is 
etermined by the country-specific productivity as well as by the country-specific taxes  d
implicit in the unfunded pension system. For this, we assume that the membership in the 
national pension systems follows the employment principle. Positive or negative implicit 
taxes distort the migration decision while at the same time migration and fertility influence 




equilibrium only leads to an efficient allocation of labour if the implicit taxes are either zero, 
countries, which corresponds to a neutralisation of the distortionary effects on the allocation 
of labour. The discussion in the next section will make use of these observations. 
 
Implicit taxes are not a minor and thus negligible part of the contributions. They are large 
enough to effect migration decisions based on lifetime income. Wildasin 
labour is distorted,  N N , leading to an efficiency loss. This implies that the migration 
which means an abolition of the unfunded pension system, or if they are equal across 
(1999) has 
alculated implicit taxes for the pension systems of seven European countries.
4 Table 1 
ne of the 
ther countries reduce their implicit tax burden quite substantially.
5 Depending on how 
                                                
c
displays implicit taxes over the life cycle of individuals of age 20 and 40 in selected European 
countries depending on their age and their marital status. Given the many assumptions needed 
to arrive at these results, the absolute values might be less informative than the relativ  
differences across countries. What can, however, be said when looking at individual countries 
is that the present value of contributions falls short of the present value of pension benefits for 
young individuals in all countries with huge differences across countries, ranging from a loss 
of 3% to 31% of lifetime wealth for singles and 2% to 30% for married individuals. 
 
It can easily be seen that implicit taxes of this magnitude might affect the decision to migrate. 
With the exception of the Netherlands, Germans for example who migrate to any o
e
o
sensitive migrants are with respect to these tax differences, an efficient allocation of labour is 
then very improbable.  
 
4 Individuals are assumed to earn the mean wage in each country, with their lifetime earning growing over time 
to take account of the effect of experience on wages. All individuals start working at age 20 and retire when they 
are entitled to receive full retirement benefits. Individuals are either single or married with a non-working spouse 
and no children. To simplify the analysis, spouses are assumed to die at the same age as the individual. 
5 The formerly centrally planned economies of Eastern and Central Europe inherited comprehensive unfunded 
old-age security systems (see Gern, 2002, for an overview). Pension expenditures have been high and have even 
increased in the early years after the transition. Reform activities have so far not led to fundamental changes. But 
major reforms including shifts towards more funding are now intensively discussed in several countries. 
Depending on whether these reforms will succeed in reducing the implicit taxes, the decision whether to migrate 
after accession and where to go will be affected and the allocation of labour will thus be distorted.   
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Table 1: Implicit taxes by age and marital status  
(in Euros and as a percentage of lifetime wealth) 
Country Single  Married  Single  Married 






































































ribution  and pen rmula tive in 
for countries with comparable data of cont utions and nefits 
Source:  Wildasin (1999, p.265) 
Legend: Calculations for cont  rates sion fo e opera 1986 
  rib  be
In the following, we assume a fixed-benefit pension system. Thus, demographic changes only 
affect the w  higher life-
expectancy the imp als to emigrate; but 
fewer people in country f lead to lower contributions to the pension system. To balance the 
orking generations, but not the retirees. If due to ageing in the form of
licit taxes increase in country f, this induces individu
pension budget, country f must either raise the contribution rate or lower the pension benefits 
or both. Both increases the implicit taxes even further inducing even more migration. This 
shows that a country with a pension system with a highly negative implicit tax experiences 
emigration while a country with a less negative implicit tax is characterised by immigration. 
Without any form of harmonisation, these migration trends reinforce themselves. Countries 
then face incentives to reduce contribution rates in the first place in order to initiate this 
migration process in their favour. Countries which want to avoid that migration happens at 
their expense follow. But neither of them takes the externalities into account which they exert 
mutually. In the end, we can observe a “race to the bottom” with respect to old-age security.  
 
This illustrates the potential trade-off between allocative and distributive objectives. It is 
therefore necessary to choose a level of harmonisation which neutralises the effect of implicit 
taxes and thus allows undistorted migration without the complete erosion of redistribution.  
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3. Policy options   
Efficiency requires that marginal productivities, i.e. gross wages, are equal across countries. 
The migration equilibrium, which equalises net wages, leads to an efficient allocation of 
labour if and only if (implicit) taxes are equal in both countries. The problem to be solved is 
vant migration scenarios the level of harmonisation that leads to equa-
lised implicit taxes. All distortions of the migration decision due to implicit taxes are then 
nded pension system is, however, not Pareto-improving if there are no idiosyncratic and 
an Union and its preceding organisations. Although there is no explicit 
tatement concerning national old-age security systems, it is possible to find indirect 
                                                
to determine for all rele
neutralised and an efficient allocation of labour can be realised. For this to be achieved, the 
policy variables are the country-specific contribution rates. Contribution rates must be set to 
balance differences in the population growth rates due to fertility differences after migration.   
 
There are several ways how to neutralise the effect of implicit taxes on the migration decision. 
One option would be the complete elimination of national pension systems which would also 
eliminate the distortions of the migration decision due to implicit taxes. The partial or 
complete abolition of an existing unfunded pension system or equivalently the transition to a 
fu
static inefficiencies which originate from the unfunded pension system.
6 It is not possible to 
find an abolition or transition path which makes all generations better off. Either the old 
generations loose their pension benefits or the young have to contribute without acquiring 
own claims or both.  
 
The mix of funded and unfunded elements in the pension system can therefore not be judged 
on the basis of efficiency, but is essentially a matter of intergenerational fairness. For the 
question of interest here this can be operationalised by looking at the documents which 
constitute the Europe
s
indications. “The raising of the standard of living and quality of life” for all generations has 
been a priority for the Member States since the very beginning (Art.2 ToR
7).
8 Starting from 
this statement, there has been a growing conviction concerning the importance of social 
policy for ensuring a high and equal standard of living over the last decades.
9 The economic 
objective of the European Union has thus been complemented by social objectives.
10 
Following this evolution of social policy issues and the underlying will of the Member States, 
we will therefore abstract from considering the abolition of national pension systems. 
 
 
6 See Breyer (1989), Fenge (1995) and others. 
7 Treaty of Rome (1958). The dates refer to the year where the Treaty was ratified. 
8 See also the Preamble to the Treaty of Rome. 
9 For a more extensive historical overview see Uebelmesser (2003).  
10 For a more extensive discussion see Atkinson (1995) and Kolmar (1999). 
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If elimination is not an option, identifying and realising the optimal level of harmonisation 
becomes an issue. The effect of implicit taxes on migration within the European Union would 
anish with a single centralised European pension system. Migration from one European 
se 
f intergenerational redistribution (Breyer and Kolmar, 2002). There are several levels of 
ls of size and generosity 
s well as very different revenue structures. Despite some convergence of old-age security 
n 
We assume that membership in the national pension systems is according to the employment 
e possibility of interjurisdictional transfers and 
individual payments. For this restricted policy space, we determine the minimum degree of 
                                                
v
country to another would no longer imply a move from one national pension system to 
another and the migration decision would thus be undistorted. This is, however, a rather ex-
treme solution given the independent history of the national European pension systems.  
 
Starting from complete centralisation, we therefore want to identify the most decentralised 
structure which allows achieving an efficient allocation of labour without initiating a collap
o
harmonisation which have to be considered. Co-ordination or equalisation of contribution 
rates leads to a strong link between national pension systems. In such a system, an absolute 
level which contribution rates may neither exceed nor undercut might be defined or a relative 
level in relation to other countries’ contribution rates. For the special case where contribution 
rates are equal across countries, the national pension systems are called equalised. A weaker 
form of harmonisation is the mutual recognition of pension benefits.
11 National pension 
systems without any form of harmonisation are called decentralised.  
 
It is evident that linking pension systems by harmonising their contribution rates and/or 
benefit levels is difficult if this means to reconcile very different leve
a
originating from the Beveridgean or Bismarckian tradition, public pension systems still 
display some differences with respect to their aim and scope. Pension systems are also 
difficult to harmonise if the source of revenue is different consisting predominately either of 
contributions or taxes. In all those cases, the level of redistribution which results from harmo-
nising need not equal the level of redistribution most preferred by the majority of the Member 
States. In the following, we assume that the national pension systems are sufficiently similar. 
Options, which are particularly suitable for old-age security systems with significant dif-
ferences, are analysed in section 7.  
4. Optimal level of harmonisatio
principle and abstract for now from th
harmonisation necessary and sufficient for efficient allocation of labour and intergenerational 
 
11 Examples for this are the exportability of benefits and the conversion of insurances periods. See the 
regulations 1408/71 and 574/72 for the details. 
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redistribution given different degrees of mobility. We then use this as a benchmark to evaluate 
the realised level of harmonisation.  
 
As a benchmark, we first look at the case of unrestricted mobility in all periods.
12 The final 
oal of the European Union is the realisation of the four liberties – among them the free 
ted policy space considered here
13 the equalisation of contribution rates is 
ufficient and necessary for an efficient allocation of labour even with different fertility rates.  
ontribution rates and the population and productivity growth rates relative to the market rate 
ation, it is useful to focus on two 
ases which reflect the most probable scenarios for the European Union: restricted mobility 
g
movement of labour. Barriers to mobility are consequently dismantled which leads to a 
reduction of mobility costs. This development will allow efficient allocation of labour but 
endangers the financial sustainability of the social security systems making redistribution 
difficult.    
Breyer and Kolmar (2002) show on the basis of the results by Homburg and Richter (1993) 
that for this restric
s
 
As has already been pointed out, differences in implicit taxes across countries lead to 
distortions of the migration decision. The burden depends in particular on the country-specific 
c
of return.
14 With productivity growth rates assumed to be zero, the contribution rates are 
choice variables of the government, while the population growth rates are choice variables of 
the present and the future generations. In a steady-state equilibrium with perfect foresight, the 
differences in fertility rates are eliminated by (unrestricted) migration if the national pension 
systems do not lead to additional incentives to migrate due to differences in contribution rates. 
Consequently, an efficient migration equilibrium requires that contribution rates have to be 
equalised – either at a positive level or at the level of zero. It is then optimal to migrate until 
fertility rates are equal as it is consistent to believe that the members of the next generation 
will behave identically. Centralisation is thus not required.  
 
The case of unrestricted mobility is helpful – though in sharp contrast to European reality. In 
order to draw conclusions for the optimal level of harmonis
c
today and either unrestricted mobility or restricted mobility in the future. As we will see, the 
degree of mobility in the future determines the minimum requirements of harmonisation for 
an efficient allocation of labour.  
 
Case I: Restricted mobility today and unrestricted mobility in the future:  
For unrestricted mobility from period  1 + t  onwards, we know from the analysis above that an 
fficient allocation of labour requires equal contribution rates. It must only be verified 
                                                
e
 
12 The terms “unrestricted” and “restricted” refer to the part of the population for which mobility costs are low 
enough. They do not imply that there are any restrictions due to interventions from the government.  
13 Note that we abstract here from the possibility of interjurisdictional transfers and individual payments. 
14 See Sinn (2000) for more details. 
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iod t on. Breyer and  whether equal contribution rates are compatible with efficiency from per
Kolmar (2002) show that this is in fact the case. As a result, an equalisation of contribution 
rates is the minimum level of harmonisation which leads to an efficient allocation of labour.  
 
Case II: Restricted mobility today and in all future periods: 
With restricted mobility in all periods, we have to distinguish three cases concerning the 
egree of mobility from periods  1 + t  onwards (Breyer and Kolmar, 2002). For the minimum 
e to the differences in the fertility 
e period 
* t from which on the 
opulation growth rate in both countries will be identical. This brings us back to the results 
ty is large enough so that the fertility difference 
an be compensated and the population distribution between the two countries will be 
he projections of Eurostat (2000) 
onfirm this view. The total volume of net migration to countries of the European Union will 
d
level of harmonisation, the size of the mobile group relativ
rate is essential. The reason for this is that the implicit taxes in both countries depend on the 
growth rates of the population aft igration has taken place.   
 
If the mobile group is big enough to compensate for the fertility differences, the population 
distribution can converge over time (Case IIa). There exists som
er m
p
for unrestricted mobility. Equal contribution rates are then necessary and sufficient for an 
efficient allocation of labour in all periods.  
 
If the mobile group is, however, not big enough to balance the fertility difference, two further 
cases have to be distinguished. First, mobili
c
stabilised on the initial level (Case IIb). Second, mobility is too small. The population 
distribution will further diverge (Case IIc). Since in these two cases the growth rate of the 
population cannot be equalised by migration, equal contribution rates in both countries would 
not lead to a neutralisation of the country-specific implicit taxes. Breyer and Kolmar (2002) 
show that for these cases co-ordinated contribution rates are necessary and sufficient for 
efficiency, i.e. the contribution rates must be set in a specific ratio to one another which 
depends on the country-specific population growth rates.   
 
No matter how long the time horizon, Wildasin (2000) expects mobility to increase but does 
not consider perfect mobility to be a realistic scenario. T
c
even slightly decrease in the next 50 years from a total of 661,000 in 2000 to 622,000 in 2050. 
Even though it can be assumed that intra-EU migration will be more important in the next few 
decades at the cost of immigration from non-EU countries, the numbers indicate that mobility 
will be far from 100%. To increase mobility, the European Commission (1996) has identified 
the following areas as requiring in particular further effort: Mutual recognition or 
harmonisation of professional degrees and harmonisation of the tax systems and the social 
security systems including pension systems. A common language – though very unlikely to be 
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agreed upon – would also reduce migration costs. Although there is some progress, it will be 
difficult to completely remove the most important barriers to migration.   
 
To sum up, if we characterise the present situation in the European Union with respect to 
igration as one with restricted mobility, there are two relevant scenarios to distinguish. First, 
5. Realised level of harmonisation  
nion as briefly discussed above shows that social 
policy as a by-product of economic policy or as an independent objective to complement 
rity, are 
mited to regulations of the mutual recognition of pension claims without linking old-age 
grant workers 
and their dependants: (a) aggregation, for the purpose of acquiring and 
Old-age  a lack of 
harmonisation endangers the free movement of workers. In particular, the acquisition of 
                                                
m
mobility could be equally restricted in the next periods. Second, mobility could increase and 
become (close to) unrestricted. For both cases, a co-ordination or equalisation of contribution 
rates across countries is necessary and sufficient for efficiency. Centralisation of national 
pension systems in the form of a unified European pension system is not required. We now 
analyse the institutional setting of the European Union to compare the optimal level of 
harmonisation to the realised one.  
The historical evolution of the European U
economic integration are both anchored in the understanding of the European Union.  
 
The measures of the European Community, which concern in particular old-age secu
li
security systems any closer. Art.48 ToR (39 ECT
15) states explicitly that the freedom of 
movement for workers has to be secured by “abolition of any discrimination based on 
nationality” while Art.8a ToR (18 ECT) extends the right of free movement to every citizen 
of the European Union. Art.49 ToR (40 ECT) regulates the abolition of administrative 
obstacles in general. Art.51 ToR (42 ECT) mentions measures necessary to provide freedom 
of movement in the field of social security. In particular, it states that  
The Council shall […] make arrangements to secure for mi
retaining the right to benefit and of calculating the amount of benefit, of all 
periods taken into account under the laws of the several countries; (b) 
payment of benefits to persons resident in the territories of Member States.  
security is thus a relevant issue for the European Union in the sense that 
pension claims and the payment of pension benefits must be secured for migrant workers. The 
details can be found in regulation 1408/71 and (implementing) regulation 574/72. Both define 
 
15 Treaty of the European Community (1993). 
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procedures concerning the recognition of pension claims of migrant workers such that 
migrants and non-migrants have to be treated equally.  
 
Over the last decades, the awareness for social policy issues at the European level 
dependent from economic considerations, which has been accompanied by the pro-
unity have been 
nambiguously extended to social policy issues which have previously been in the 
establish the optimal 
vel of harmonisation have already been transferred to the European level. For the most 
5.1 Distribution of competences 
as been concerned with the creation of the Economic 
Union on the basis of the four freedoms of movement. It has not been a primary goal to 
                                                
in
European position of the European Court of Justice,
16 has increased – though not always 
continuously. Social policy issues are no longer reduced to supporting the evolution of the 
common market, but are more and more regarded as an objective in itself. Correspondingly 
the competences of the European Community have been extended including legislative 
authority in the area of social policy since the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999).  
 
This gives grounds to think that the competences of the European Comm
u
responsibility of the Member States; and that this process is going to continue with 
consequences for the level of harmonisation. In order to be able to evaluate whether this 
impression is correct, we look in more detail at the distribution of competences as far as the 
national pension systems are concerned. Competences can be seen as a means to the end of a 
certain level of harmonisation. Knowledge of the distribution of competences therefore helps 
to understand the observed level of harmonisation. 
 
The question is whether the competences which would be needed to 
le
realistic migration scenarios, we have seen that equalisation or co-ordination of contribution 
rates is needed to guarantee the efficient allocation of labour and to avoid an erosion of 
intergenerationally redistributive activities  
The realisation of European integration h
appropriate social policy competences from the Member States (Breyer and Kolmar, 1996). 
The competences for social policy are thus principally located at the national level. The 
European institutions lack the legal basis to intervene, e.g., in the nationally organised old-age 
security systems. From the legal perspective, the territorial principle applies to all areas of 
social policy, i.e. the Member States are responsible for social issues in their territory. In the 
 
16 See in particular Judgement of the Court of 21 October 1975, case 24/75 (Petroni), European Court reports, 
1975; Judgement of the Court of 5 July 1967, case 1/67, (Ciechelski), European Court reports, 1967, section 2; 
Judgement of the Court of 14 March 1989, case 1/88 (Baldi), European Court reports, 1989, section 22. 
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case of old-age security, the territory principle corresponds to the employment principle 
which implies that the membership in a national pension system is determined by the place of 
employment.  
 
This principle, however, is limited if free mobility of labour (Art.39 ECT) is endangered. 
egislative activities at the European level can then be justified – at least if they are in 
ompetence, the 
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of 
Art.5 th deemed 
necessary including areas not specifically mentioned in the Treaty. But this is restricted to 
instances where the subsidiarity principle is not violated and where the actions of the 
siders the principle of subsidiarity as not very effective to protect the competences 
f the Member States.  
Art.137 (3) ECT). Social security issues thus require unanimity of the 
ouncil. This implies that the Member States have veto power or “ultimate sovereignty”.
18  
n 
                                                
L
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as stated in Art.5 ECT  
[…] In areas which do not fall within its exclusive c
subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by 
the Community. […]
17  
us regulates in which areas the European Community may act if this is 
European Community can be justified by the objectives of the Treaty. The additional 
competences which can be derived for the European level are thus limited by the subsidiarity 
principle.   
The question is, however, whether these limitations are in any way binding, or to say it 




As far as pension issues are concerned, however, the Council can only act unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic 
and Social Committee (
C
 
In general, the de facto distribution of competences is not very clear.
19 Given the high degree 
of interaction between economic integration and social policy issues, the fields of social 
policy which are related to the freedom of movement and other aspects of the commo
 
17 See also Art.2 EUT which explicitly refers to Art.5 ECT. 
18 In other areas, this is no longer the case. Question concerning, for example, the equality between men and 
women, working conditions, etc., the Council may adopt directives by a qualified majority under the co-decision 
ittee and the Committee of the Regions (Art.251 
   
procedure after consulting the Economic and Social Comm
ECT). 
19 The so-called Post-Nice Process is supposed to clarify this by 2004. A more concrete definition of European 
and national competences as well as the role of national parliaments within the European Union is part of the 
agenda.
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internal market are numerous. Alone the economic importance of old-age security would 
suffice to justify the competences of the European Community in this area. For many social 
policy issues, the competences are already shared between the European Community and the 
Member States with the centre of gravity shifting more and more to the European level as the 
integration process advances. However, concerning pension issues, the main competences still 
remain with the Member States – either because of their specific responsibilities in this area or 
because of their veto power. This is of course not without consequences for the level of 
harmonisation.  
5.2 Impact on the level of harmonisation  
We have analysed the optimal level of harmonisation which guarantees an efficient allocation 
ional redistribution. For the realistic cases 
of restricted mobility today and restricted or unrestricted mobility in the future, co-ordination 
free movement of 
bour support the mutual recognition of pension claims. It is possible for the European 
 legislative authority of the European Community in the social area is described in 
rt.136 and 137 ECT. Although the objective of supporting the social development in various 
of the Member States” (Art.137 (2)). This is concretised as “excluding any harmonisation of 
the laws and regulations of the Member States” (Art.137 (4)).  
                                  
of labour without a complete erosion of intergenerat
or equalisation of the contribution rates leads to optimal results. We now want to see what 
impact the distribution of competences between the Member States and the European 
Community has on the level of harmonisation and compare the outcome with the optimal 
level. It is useful to look at the competences and the resulting level of harmonisation 
separately for activities which support the economic and social objectives.  
 
We begin with actions of the European Community within the framework of the economic 
objectives. The measures which are intended to reduce the obstacles to 
la
Community to demand from Member States to recognise pension claims acquired in other 
Member States in order to ensure that workers and members of their families exercising their 




And which level of harmonisation results from the increase in competences within the Social 
Union? The
A
areas is reaffirmed, it is emphasised that “[…] the Community and the Member States shall 
implement measures which take account of the diverse forms of national practices […]” 
(Art.136 (2)). It is required that “the Council may adopt […] minimum requirements for 
gradual implementation, having regard to the conditions and technical rules obtaining in each 
                
20 See Art.42 ECT and regulations 1408/71 and 574/72. 
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With regard to the national social security systems, Art.137 (4) more specifically states that  
[t]he provisions adopted […] shall not affect the right of Member States to 
define the fundamental principles of their social security systems and must 
not significantly affect the financial equilibrium thereof […]. 
Especially the last point underlines, that the European Community is not entitled to 
appropri pension 
systems. ropean 
Commun  the obstacles to free 
movement of labour. As we have already observed, the level of harmonisation – limited to the 
el of social transfers per se, but the organisational structure that might be 
responsible for the non-achievement of maximum gross national products“ (p.148f). The 
ised institutional structure on the efficient 
allocation of labour and the level of redistribution.  
r mobility is distorted.  
 
the European Union are obliged to mutually recognise pension 
claims acquired in other Member States (Art.42 ECT). Migrating from one country to another 
d-age security, the 
ate in any way the responsibility of the Member States for the national 
 Concerning the harmonisation efforts, the legislative authority of the Eu
ity seems to be restricted to those measures which reduce
mutual recognition of pension claims – is low. Although the general competences of the 
European Community have been extended to instances where “measures of the Member 
States or no measures at all violate the requirements of the Treaty, e.g., with respect to 
economic and social integration” (Protocol No 30, 1997), the concrete provisions are limited 
to the adoption of “minimum requirements for gradual implementation” (Art.137 (2)). The 
economic objectives are thus (still) the driving force for the harmonisation efforts and not the 
social objectives. 
6. Evaluation of the institutional results  
After having analysed the theoretically optimal and the institutionally realised level of 
harmonisation, we now turn to compare both results. As Breyer and Kolmar (1996) point out, 
„[i]t is not the lev
focus will therefore be on the impact of the real
6.1 Allocation of labour 
Two aspects have to be distinguished. The first one concerns the question whether all 
obstacles have been removed so that free movement is possible within the European Union. 
The second one deals with efficiency asking whethe
As we have seen, countries of 
country is not impeded by losing pension benefits. Individuals will thus migrate to countries 
where their labour income over the life-cycle net of explicit and implicit taxes is maximal. If 
we abstract from differences in explicit taxes and restrict our attention to ol
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choice of the destination country will then be determined by differences in gross wages, i.e. in 
hether the 
ecisions of the Court with respect to migration stimulate a sub-optimal level of migration in 
as from explicit taxes. The regulations concerning 
e free movement ignore the presence of distortions and the Court does not use its authority 
eral and the free movement of 
labour in particular are endangered has the European Union the right to intervene. To 
peded by incompatibilities of the national pension systems, 
Member States must mutually recognise pension claims.  
marginal productivities if we assume complete labour markets, and differences in the taxes 
implicit in the national pension systems. While migration that equates gross wages results in 
an optimal allocation of labour, this is not the case for migration that leads to equal wages net 
of implicit taxes – if implicit taxes differ across countries. The analysis of the institutional 
regulations of the European Union has shown that equalising and thus neutralising implicit 
taxes is not an explicit goal of the process of convergence. A reduction of the distortions due 
to different implicit tax burdens could only emerge as an accidental by-product.   
 
The European Court of Justice more explicitly influences migration when interpreting the 
regulations 1408/71 and 574/72 in a pro-migration way. In fact, the European Court of Justice 
has to rule in accordance with the European Treaties which explicitly put forward the 
objective to support the process of European integration. The Court assumes implicitly that 
intra-European migration promotes integration. The question is, however, w
d
the sense of too much migration. Positively discriminating migrants compared to non-
migrants might lead to distortions of the optimal allocation of labour. The economic objective 
and the objective of the Court differ concerning migration; potentially inefficient migration 
might be encouraged or even intensified.  
 
National pension systems do not present important obstacles to migration. The principle of 
mutual recognition ensures that the free movement of labour is not hindered. Measures which 
guarantee that migration is undistorted are, however, absent. Neither the national countries 
nor the European institutions seem to be aware of the distortions of the allocation of labour 
which stem from implicit taxes – as well 
th
to create the preconditions for an efficient allocation of labour. 
6.2 Level of redistribution 
Despite the increase in competences of the European Community for social policy issues, the 
responsibility for the organisation of the national pension systems stays with the Member 
States. Only when the functioning of the common market in gen
guarantee that mobility is not im
 
All initiatives to harmonise the national pension systems further – e.g. in the form of co-
ordinated or equalised contribution rates – are based on a process of convergence in the 
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medium-term via the identification and realisation of best practices and depend on the 
voluntary agreements of the Member States. This process thus lacks the binding character 
necessary to avoid a “race to the bottom” of intergenerationally redistributive activities even 
ough the European Community has the legislative authority to transform the results of the 
allocation of labour nor prevents a “race to the bottom” of intergenerational 
redistribution. So, how should the competences be optimally distributed to achieve these 
tricted policy space? 
 
 of (fiscal) externalities need to be determined. 
he political decision-making should then be allocated to the level at which an internalisation 
xpectancy is below average, can escape by 
igrating. This makes it clear that a more pronounced involvement of the European level is 
                                                
th
convergence process into binding laws (Eichenhofer, 2002). But it must be doubted whether 
the Member States will agree on the harmonisation of fundamental aspects of the national 
pension systems as, e.g., the contribution rate. If they do not, i.e. if pension systems remain 




For the restricted policy space, the analysis so far has shown that the approach towards 
harmonisation of national pension systems as chosen by the European Union neither leads to 
an efficient 
objectives given the res
To answer this question, let us turn again to the principle of subsidiarity. In the context of the 
distribution of competences between the Member States and the European Community, subsi-
diarity indicates that the responsibility should be with the lowest level which can fulfil the 
task in the best way. For the economic application of the subsidiarity principle with respect to 
old-age security, the existence and the range
T
can be best guaranteed and an efficient allocation of labour and intergenerational 
redistribution can be reached (Krieger, 2001). 
 
The main features of pension systems are that they redistribute incomes across generations 
and within generations from individuals with bad luck as to longevity to individuals with 
good luck (Kolmar, 1997). The ex post enforcement of the contract is, however, not possible 
in the context of the employment principle. The net contributors, i.e. the young or those who 
have information indicating that their life-e
m
needed.    
This result is nothing else than an application of the “selection principle” (Sinn, 1997, 2003). 
If, as we have seen, old-age security fulfils the criteria for an intervention of the state at the 
 
21 Breyer and Kolmar (2002) show that the co-ordination requirements are incompatible with voluntary co-
ordination of the Member States. If every country maximises national welfare without taking into account the 
external effects on other countries, a unilateral deviation is profitable.  
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national level according to the “selection principle”, introducing competition on the European 
level cannot lead to an efficient outcome. Even though the main competences for old-age 
security can stay with the Member States, the necessary responsibilities must be conceded to 
the European Union to allow an effective monitoring of the harmonisation rules.  
 histories of 
ocial security systems in each Member State. In some circumstances, harmonisation becomes 
o longer implies the immediate change from the 
pension system of the country of origin to the pension system of the destination country 
mployment principle.  
A direct way to attack the problem of externalities of migration on national pension systems is 
transfers (Kolmar, 1997). If changes in the 
pension system of one country cause external effects in other countries, the responsible 
risdictional contracts are renegotiation 
oof.    
 
It has been realised that a higher level of harmonisation is needed in various areas of social 
policy including old-age security; and that a closer cooperation is useful given the similar 
challenges which the national pension systems have to face. So far, we have analysed the 
impact of increased labour mobility on unfunded pensions systems which are very similar 
with respect to important aspects, e.g. size and generosity. But it is evident that different 
views on how to organise old-age security coexist in Europe given the distinct
s
very demanding if not impossible. In the next section, we therefore discuss solutions which 
might be less controversial and which can be applied to unfunded pension systems which 
differ with respect to their aim and scope.  
7. Extensions 
We now include transfers and payments among the available measures thus enlarging the 
policy space. We also look at the case where migration does not at all affect the membership 
in a pension system (home-country principle) or only with a delay of several years (principle 
of delayed integration). Migration then n
according to the e
7.1 Transfers and individual payments  
For the moment, we maintain the assumption that membership in pension systems follows the 
employment principle and discuss other options which lead to an efficient allocation of labour 
without a complete erosion of redistributive activities  
  
to internalise these effects via interjurisdictional 
country has to pay transfers to compensate the other countries. As can be shown (Breyer and 
Kolmar, 2002) only compulsory transfers work. In addition, it must be assumed that the 
information problem can be solved and that the interju
pr  
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It is also possible to shift the responsibility for the transfers from the interjurisdictional level, 
i.e. the country, to the individual. Externalities on the pension systems of the source country 
and/or the destination country due to migration can then be internalised via payments from the 
individual. Depending on the direction of the external effects of the migration decision, an 
exit or an entry fee could be constructed.   
 
For interjurisdictional transfers and individual payments, the requirements are much less 
emanding than for the case discussed above with the harmonisation of national pension 
 the pension systems are.  
d distortions of the migration decision due to taxes implicit in social security systems, 
Sinn (1990) proposes to replace the employment principle by the home-country principle. 
te once for their entire life. 
Then, migrating does no longer help to escape the system; especially the implicit taxes of the 
ifference in gross wages. An efficient allocation of labour 
sults.  
d
systems in the form of equalisation or co-ordination of contribution rates. As these transfers 
and payments do not affect the general structure of the national pension systems, old-age 
security systems remain more independent from one another. It is therefore no longer 
necessary that they are similar in important aspects. In contrast, externalities due to migration 
can be internalised no matter how different
 
It is evident that with 15 Member States at the moment and 10 more Member States from 
2004 on, bilateral bargaining would prove to be a very complicated and complex issue. A 
central authority would therefore be needed for setting the transfers and payments, 
coordinating the redistribution of income across countries and controlling the compliance 
(Wildasin 1991, 1994). So even with this very much decentralised option, the Member States 
would be required to concede the necessary – albeit smaller – responsibilities to the European 
level.  
7.2 Home-country principle and delayed integration 
The inefficiencies with respect to the allocation of labour and the danger of a complete 
erosion of redistributive activities stem from the opportunity of individuals to opt out of an 
existing social contract after the individual risk is realised. Abolishing this option would 
remove the incentives to do so.  
 
To avoi
Individuals choose a social security system of one Member Sta
chosen pension system cannot be avoided by changing the place of employment. The 
externalities of migration on the national pension systems are completely internalised. The 
migration decision is thus not affected by differences of the pension burden between 
countries, but depends on the d
re  
Replacing the employment principle by the home-country principle eliminates any form of 
fiscal competition. In this respect the home-country principle is comparable to a close linking 
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of pension systems. Whether less competition should be preferred to more competition or vice 
versa depends on what one thinks about the general operation of unfunded public pension 
systems (Oates, 2001, 2002). We thus enlarge the analysis by taking political economy 
arguments into account. If we assume that those responsible for the national pension systems 
seek to promote social welfare, the home-country principle is the best solution. If, however, 
we adhere to the Leviathan belief and assume that national pension systems are dominated by 
the interplay of special interest groups, the evaluation of the home-country principle is less 
ositive.   
otivated by the employment principle which endangers the financial sustainability 
f the national pension systems, and too few outside options due to the home-country 
shorter delay and more similar to the home-country principle for a longer 
elay. Thus, the two essential aspects – distortions of labour allocation and containment of 
p
 
In the specific context of unfunded pension systems, those who determine the fundamental 
parameters of old-age security are for the main part the voters. The home-country principle, 
therefore, bears the risk that the young – once they have opted for a certain national pension 
system – can be more easily exploited by the old in a gerontocracy. The young can counter-
balance the power of the old – even when they no longer have the political majority – if they 
have the option to decrease their domestic labour supply, e.g., by emigrating.
22 Depriving 
them of the option to escape the system reduces their possibilities to react to even higher 
pension burdens shifted to them from the old. There is thus a trade-off between too much 
migration m
o
principle. Although this problem concerns intergenerational redistribution and not efficiency, 
it is necessary to take it into account when thinking about putting the home-country principle 
into practice.   
 
If fiscal competition is welcome in order to counter-balance gerontocratic tendencies, the 
employment principle should be advocated. If fiscal competition is, however, seen as 
endangering the efficient allocation of labour, the home-country principle should be chosen. 
But both alternative principles present rather extreme ways of how to assign migrants to juris-
dictions. It has therefore been proposed to opt for a middle course with the principle of 
delayed integration (Sinn, 2002, and Richter, 2002).
23 This principle means that migrating 
from one country to another country results in the assignment to the fiscal and social systems 
of the destination country with some delay. The principle is closer to the employment 
principle for a 
d
gerontocratic tendencies – are both taken into account to a certain extent. Compared to the 
employment principle differences in national pension systems which result in different 
implicit taxes do not distort the migration decision for short-term migration and play a smaller 
                                                 
22 See Thum and Uebelmesser (2003). 
23 See also the report of the Council of Advisors of the German Ministry of Finance (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat, 
2001). 
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role for long-term migration. At the same time, the reassignment of migrants to the pension 
system of the destination country – even though with some delay – works as a counterbalance 
to potential gerontocratic or Leviathan tendencies.    
 
Once more, a central authority would be needed for setting the exact rules and controlling the 
compliance. The Member States would again have to concede some responsibilities to the 
European level. 
8. Conclusion 
Although for all three options discussed – harmonisation, transfers and payments and delayed 
tegration – competences have to be shifted from the Member States to the European Union, 
The requirements for equalising or co-ordinating contribution rates are by far the most 
 national pension systems must display similarities in the most important 
aspects and second, the Member States must be willing to forgo fundamental decision-making 
l insurance type” systems in the tradition of Bismarck. Beside, the 
nalysis of the institutional development has shown that the Member States are still far away 
o sum up, the relation between migration and national pension systems must be considered 
that national pension systems are replaced by a uniform European pension system in order to 
c
in
the extent to which the Member States would have to restrict their responsibility for old-age 
security is different.  
 
demanding. First,
powers. Even though, the national pension systems have already converged to a certain extent 
during the last decades as a reaction to exogenous factors, fundamental differences still exist 
especially with respect to systems organised as “flat-rate benefit” systems in the tradition of 
Beveridge and “socia
a
from approving the necessary shift of competences to the European level where the national 
pension systems are concerned.  
 
Transfers and payments as well as a change from the employment principle to the principle of 
delayed integration have therefore some merits. First, as the national pension systems remain 
rather independent from one another, differences with respect to size and generosity do not 
present important obstacles. Second, although these options also require that the Member 
States concede some responsibilities to the European level, the scope is nevertheless much 
more reduced.   
 
T
when thinking about a reform of old-age security in the European Union. Not sufficiently 
harmonised national pension systems within the European Union distort the allocation of 
labour and endanger redistributive activities. As we have seen, it is not necessary to require 
ure both problems. The main responsibility can stay with the Member States; but the 
  20  
European Union must be involved sufficiently to guarantee the binding nature of the 
harmonisation rules. 
 
If the Member States fail to agree on the role of the European Union, it is well possible that 
tional social policies (European Council, 2000) is not able to avoid 
ompetition among the pension systems of the Member States. It must be hoped that the open 
Aaron, Henry (1966): “The Social Insurance Paradox“, Canadian Journal of Economics and 
Political Science 32, 371-374. 
(1995): Incomes and the Welfare State, Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge.  
Breyer, Friedrich and Martin Kolmar (1996): “Social Policy in a Common Market: Labour 
t, Social Arbitrage, and Public Finance“, in Holzmann, Robert (ed.): 
Maastricht: Monetary Constitution without a Fiscal Constitution?, Nemos: Baden-
Breyer  (2002): “Are National Pension Systems Efficient if 
Eichengreen, Barry (1991): Is Europe an Optimum Currency Area?, NBER Working Paper 
3579, Cambridge, MA.  
the demographic pressure on the national pension systems induces the Member States to fall 
back on either or both of two strategies: first, to set a “race to the bottom” in motion to attract 
contributors and second, to erect obstacles to prevent contributors from emigrating. As this 
development would be the exact opposite of the objectives of the European Union, it is very 
important to start with reforms as soon as possible. The European Council has realised this 
and initiated the process of the “open method of co-ordination” at the Lisbon Summit in 2000. 
But convergence based on the exchange of information in order to initiate a process of 
adapting common na
c
method is only the first step towards a more courageous approach leading to a more pro-
nounced involvement of the European level in the area of old-age security.   
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